CHAPTER XI.

ATONEMENT.

No system of theology that should leave the doctrine of atonement without special notice, would be considered as complete; and, indeed, such a system would be radically defective. A great deal has been said and written professedly upon this important subject; but I hope I may be excused for saying that, according to my judgment, much of what has been written has been to little or no purpose. Not pretending to be able to instruct the theological world, it is my constant desire to be useful to the "poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom." I believe the essential doctrines of the gospel--such as we have been discussing in the preceding pages--have been pretty correctly understood by the true church in all ages, from the days of the apostles to the present time, and we have no reason to expect any new discoveries in the plan of salvation. There is room for the wisest to increase in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ; but, in the fundamental principles of the gospel, nothing new will be brought to light that is essential to the great system of gospel truth. All that is indispensably necessary is to have access to the word of God, and a heart prepared to receive the instruction. I shall not aspire to the honor of new discovery; but if I can offer a thought that will throw any additional light on any part of the subject into the mind of my reader, verily I shall have my desired reward.

If the word atonement was a scriptural term, and of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, like justification and redemption, we might ascertain its scriptural meaning by consulting the connection in which it is used by inspired writers: but it is not so; the word is used, I believe, but once in that book, and in that place all good scholars concur in saying the original word should not have been translated atonement, but reconciliation. The word is often used in the Old Testament, respecting the sacrifices offered under that dispensation, and in this light I suppose it may be said to be a scriptural term. From the use there made of the word in a typical sense, we may learn something of what should be its proper meaning in an evangelical sense. But, at least, the word is properly a theological term, and, considered in this point of view, it has, or ought to have, a definite and universally accepted meaning. If the word is generally used by writers in a particular acceptation--and I believe it is--any writer who discusses the doctrine of atonement in a different sense, without at once apprising his readers, most probably has an insidious design in view; but if he really differs from others as to what we are to understand by the atonement of Christ, we have no right to require any thing more of him than a plain and unambiguous statement of the sense in which he intends to use the term, or of what he understands the atonement to be, and an honest avowal of the difference between his views and the opinions of others.

The range of my reading is comparatively very limited, so that I have consulted very few works written expressly on atonement. What little knowledge I have acquired of the various theories which have been put forth by our learned writers, has been derived incidentally from a few authors who have had occasion to refer to them. Not occupying that position in the literary world which would entitle me to claim equality with our theological authors, I have felt timid in referring to them by name; but the high respect which I entertain for those great names must not deter me from exhibiting what I believe to be the truth of God as we have it in His word, although my views might not perfectly accord with theirs in every particular idea. I am not aware, however, that my views of atonement differ materially from those which have been generally maintained by our standard orthodox divines.

With regard to the meaning of the word atonement, some are disposed to lay a good deal of stress on the etymology of the term--to wit, at-one-ment; but it requires but little knowledge of the history of our language to see that etymology is a very uncertain method of ascertaining the proper meaning of words. The English scholar stands in no need of examples to illustrate this. Besides, it is not so much the literal meaning of the word with which we are concerned; it is that particular evangelical doctrine of theology which has been generally designated by the term atonement. This doctrine I propose to discuss, and I design to employ as definite and precise language as I am able.

A late writer on atonement gives us the following definition: "It is the expiation of sin through the obedience and death of the Lord Jesus." I shall not object to this definition. The author intended no disguise or evasion. As he is still living, and is also "a brother beloved," and one who, I doubt not, loves the truth, I presume he will not be offended if I offer a critical suggestion. If, by the word obedience, we are to understand both the perfect holy obedience of His life and also His "obedience unto death"--that is, His obedience in dying--the definition is, perhaps, as unexceptionable as can well be given; but although the perfect holiness of the Redeemer's life was essential to the validity of His sacrifice--it was essential to the merit and acceptableness of the "offering" which He made for our sins, and in this sense was essential to the atonement--yet I am not quite sure that it is an essential part of the atonement itself. The holiness of Christ was necessary to honor the law in the holiness of its nature and authority, but it was the justice of the law in relation to sin that required atonement. I believe it is held by our standard writers generally, that the obligation to be perfectly conformed to the holiness of the law is intransferable, and so I understand it; if so, substitution is inadmissible. The holiness of the law requires absolute holiness of every subject of the law, and nothing else can satisfy the demand. The obligation can not be discharged by a representative. If these thoughts are correct, I can not so well see how the holiness of our Savior's life, though immaculate, can constitute an essential part of an atonement for sin. It is easy to see the perfect character was essential to His being a competent and acceptable sin-offering, and also that it was essential to His official relations to us as sinners. And further: As the law held a rightful authority over us as human subjects, it was necessary that our accepted Surety should, in human nature, honor the holiness of the law by demonstrating that the obligation to perfect holiness was not a requirement beyond the constitutional ability of human subjects. It was necessary that the holy character of the law should be fully vindicated or satisfied by inflicting the penalty for transgression upon one in human nature.

I would not be too positive on this point, and I will thankfully accept the kindness of any one who will give me more light. I have not made these remarks as intending to instruct my superiors, nor as a verbal criticism; but believing there is here a real distinction in these two aspects of the Divine law, I thought it might be well not to lose sight of it in a discourse on the atonement of Christ.

Another modern writer on atonement says: "The essential idea in the doctrine of atonement is that of substitution, or vicariousness." This postulate is objectionable; for, although in the atonement of Christ substitution is an essential condition, yet it does not belong to the essence of the atonement itself. Substitution was an indispensable prerequisite; but in the order of nature, as well as in the order of operation (if I may so express it), the substitution preceded the atonement. Christ must first become our substitute--our accepted substitute--before He could make atonement for us. Using the word atonement in its general meaning--not restricting it to the atonement of Christ--it is allowable to say there may be atonement where there is no substitution, and there may be substitution where there is no atonement. There is so wide a distinction between the ordinary signification of the two words that neither can convey the essential idea of the other.

The same writer says: "The atonement is something substituted in the place of the penalty of the law, which will answer the same ends as the punishment of the offender himself would." Passing, for the present, the very objectionable doctrines couched in this quotation, it is sufficient to say that if the atonement did not answer the end of satisfying the Divine law for our sins, it would be false to speak of it as atonement. But why adopt such a distant and pointless mode of statement?

Again: "It is through Christ that reconciliation is effected between God and man;" and,

"That in accomplishing this He suffered and died as a substitute in the place of sinners." Here our author ventures to come to the essential doctrine of the atonement--rather an unusual thing for him to do. He speaks abundantly of substitution, of law, of sufferings, and of punishment; but seems to be fearfully cautious of speaking much about the death of Christ--the very thing that constitutes a real atonement. That in which I glory above all things, he seems to be studious to keep out of view. I suppose he kept this grand transaction constantly in his own eye while treating on atonement; but he appears to be reluctant to set it before the eyes of his readers.

As I understand atonement to mean equitable satisfaction for injury, or adequate reparation, I understand the atonement, which is the subject of the present discussion, to be that satisfaction for sins which was made to the Divine law by the death of the Son of God. I suppose this statement will give the reader a sufficient idea of what I mean by atonement, but I do not pretend that all the elements and essential characteristics of the atonement are included in this one sentence. To set the idea in a clear light, let us look at a few passages of Scripture which have direct reference to atonement: "Christ died for our sins." "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust." "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." "He hath redeemed us to God by His blood." "But God commandeth His love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." "For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son." In these quotations we see what the atonement is. We might add many others to the same effect. Whatever men may think the atonement ought to be, these Scriptures show us plainly what it is. That God saves sinners through the death of His Son, is the grandest and most glorious manifestation of the all-fullness of the Divine perfection of any that He has ever made to us. Nor is it in the power of the human mind to conceive of any possible way in which all the perfections of the infinite Godhead could be revealed to created minds to a greater or to an equal extent; and how wonderful, how overwhelming the thought that such sinful wretches as we are should be graciously embraced in it! This transaction is the foundation of the whole plan of man's salvation; and when we reflect what stupendous weight of glory is dependent upon it, we can not ascribe too much importance to it. It is the good pleasure of God to lay the burden of more of the glory of His Name upon this one thing, than upon all else put together that He has ever done, of which we have any knowledge or can conceive. The sinner that builds on this foundation has nothing to fear; but a hope that rests upon any other ground must eventuate in disappointment and confusion. If there is any defect or insufficiency in the atonement, the whole scheme of man's salvation is a failure. Hence an essential error or mistake in this doctrine must vitiate all other doctrines of the gospel, for all others rest upon it. In what I write, I "consider what I say," and request the reader to do the same.

As atonement has particular respect to Divine justice, in canvassing the doctrine we should make the exact extent of its claims, and the plenary liquidation of those claims, a ruling principle throughout, for no partial reparation is atonement. The satisfaction made must be full, complete, and perfect in every respect, in which the interests and honor of Divine justice are concerned. The justice of God in its relation to us is set forth in what we usually term the moral law, and this law has two fundamental elements: First, obligation to obedience; secondly, penalty for disobedience. The obligation is just--founded in pure justice. The penalty is also just, and emanates from eternal moral justice. We have all transgressed, and have thus subjected ourselves to the administration of the penalty; and the same immutable law that prescribed the penalty must inflict it. The only way in which we, personal sinners, can satisfy the demands of penal justice, is to suffer the penalty in our own persons. If there was any way in which we could satisfy the claims of justice without suffering the penalty we might escape; but there is none. It follows therefore that we can not make atonement for our sins. We never can make a finished satisfaction, so as to found a righteous claim to a discharge from the penalty. I might enlarge upon this whole topic and show it out more fully, and, perhaps, I ought to do it; but I will pass on to what I have now more immediately before me.

In making atonement there are certain conditions which must be complied with; as,

1. The satisfaction must be made to the injured party.

2. It must be made by, or in behalf of, the offending party.

If it is not, it can not avail to his benefit.

3. If made by a substitute, such substitute must be every way competent to the work.

Otherwise the undertaking must fail.

4. The atonement must be perfect and complete.

Or it can not answer the ends for which an atonement was necessary.

In relation to the above conditions, we will examine the atonement of Christ.

These propositions are so plain and so evident, that it would seem superfluous to spend time or labor in proving or illustrating them; and yet I believe that every one of them has been expressly or virtually denied. But I can not take special notice of every artful evasion and critical perversion of gospel truth. I do not wish to become intensely controversial; but if a man will maintain the truth of Holy Scripture, it is not possible to avoid polemics.

1. Atonement must be made to the injured party. Is it not intuitively evident that when a reparation is made for injury, that it must be made to the party injured? None other had a right to require it, and none other had a right to accept it. If the sin for which atonement is made is sin against God, is it not manifest that the satisfaction, or atonement, must be made to Him? Candor can not be blind to this.

The honor of the Divine government must be maintained untarnished. This is a point insisted on largely by most writers on atonement, and it can not be defended too earnestly, nor be too thoroughly examined. But the honor of the Divine government can not be conserved without equity of the government is maintained. The honor of God's government rests fundamentally upon this principle. The honor of the Divine government requires imperatively that the righteousness of law--which is the medium or instrument of administration--should stand impeachable. We may say that the honor of the Divine government belongs rather to the order of policy, and in this respect might be optional; but the equity of God's government is a necessity--a natural and Divine necessity--and can not be optional. For Him to create rational and intelligent creatures was an act of His sovereign will; He was perfectly at liberty to create us or not create us, according to the good pleasure of His own will; but to govern us and deal with us as His subjects, in a way of strict righteousness, is not an act merely of discretionary will, though of course His will is in it, but by the necessity of His essential nature. He must govern us according to the principles of immutable and eternal justice; for it is evident beyond controversy, that if He is just in Himself, He must be just in His government.

Inflexibility is essential to justice. To suppose that it could fall short of, or extend beyond its legitimate bounds, destroys the very idea of justice; and that justice which relates to us and to our sins, is God's justice, and is as unchangeable as He is Himself, for it is an attribute of His essential nature. Hence an atonement made for our sins must be made to Him; He must be the object of atonement.

Every man who acknowledges the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, feels that He does not stand in that friendly relation to God that he would desire to do; he is sensible that all is not right between him and his Maker; he is conscious that he has sinned against his rightful Sovereign, and that his God has good reason and just cause to be displeased with him. Now, if anything is done by way of making atonement, or satisfaction, for his sins, so as to adjust the difference and remove the difficulty, whatever it may be--say the death of Christ--if he does not believe that God Himself is satisfied with it, that He approves and accepts this atonement as full satisfaction on His part, it will bring no relief; he will still be exercised with those uneasy apprehensions that God still holds his sins in remembrance. But if, on the other hand, he feels a perfect assurance that this atonement makes full satisfaction to God--that He is not only content, but well pleased with it--then the sinner finds a resting-place; he feels that he has secured ground to stand upon. But these things could not be so if the atonement was not made to God. This is the ground upon which every true believer in Christ rests upon. He is conscious that God has a just demand against him, and that Christ has died for the express purpose of satisfying that demand. If that voice, that glorious announcement, twice delivered from heaven, has no reference to atonement, it is among the least of all the revelations that God has ever made to us; but if it may be supposed to have any reference to the atonement, it is demonstrative proof that the atonement was made to Him.

It is right, however, that we should notice the present topic more immediately in the light of the moral law; and this law naturally presents itself to us in two points of view: the holiness of the law, and the justice of the law. Our obligation to a perfect obedience is founded in the holiness of the law; but the penalty for transgressions is the expression of the justice of the law; and we must not forget that the authority of the Lawgiver is in both. It is the authority of the Sovereign God that requires the obedience, and the same Divine authority declares and enforces the penalty.

The subject of the atonement, in that point of view in which we are now considering it, does not require us to say much with regard to the holiness of the law, because it makes but the one demand upon us--that is, absolute perfect holiness; and this it makes on every individual personal subject of the law. It does not ask, and can not accept, of any commutation, satisfaction, or mitigation. The requirement--the only requirement--is personal holiness; and the obligation to render this is perpetual and unchangeable, and can not be relaxed. And, as no atonement can satisfy this demand, it can admit no substitution that will release us from obligation to be holy.

But the case is different with respect to the claims of justice. The justice of the law requires satisfaction for the injury--that is, atonement. Crime deserves punishment; and if crime is committed and passes unpunished, this is injustice. The justice of the law demands that transgression--that is, sin--shall be punished. If sin is committed against the Divine law, and the just penalty of the law is not inflicted, it is clear that there is injustice somewhere. If the requirement of obedience to the law is a just requirement, and if the penalty annexed by the law for transgression is a just penalty, then the administration of the law is not just except the penalty is inflicted. It is God himself that is the Lawgiver; He, and He only, enjoins the obedience; He only declares the penalty for disobedience; He only is the administrator of the law, and the equity of the administration is the manifestation of the justice of the Lawgiver. It therefore follows as a plain consequence, that if any atonement is made for our disobedience, it must be made to Him, that it may satisfy the demands of His justice and vindicate the equity of his administration. Our sins are sins against God, and the satisfaction must be made to Him. Hence it is said that Christ, in making atonement, "offered Himself without spot to God." Indeed, the point is made so plain by the general teachings of the Scriptures and the very nature of the case, that, without any great impropriety, I might have dispensed with any remarks on this topic, and proceeded with the general subject just as though the doctrine had never been denied or doubted; but, on account of its connection with other topics belonging to the subject, I thought I might not be quite justifiable in passing loosely over it without more special notice; and, in the further discussion of the subject, a frequent recurrence to this point will be unavoidable.

2. The atonement must be made by, or in behalf of, the offending party.

If atonement is made by the offender himself, then there is no need that another person should interpose in his behalf; and if the sinner could make the requisite satisfaction for his sins, it would supersede the necessity of any intervention on the part of Christ. But as those whom I desire to edify are looking for edification in that atonement which is made by the death of the Lord Jesus, I will not detain the reader by treating on atonement as made by the offending party. All that I should think necessary to be said would only be preparatory to atonement by substitution.

If the law is transgressed, the penalty, as a matter of course, must ensue, and the condemnation must fall on the transgressor. If one man injures another, he is under obligation to make reparation. This is a plain principle in equity. And upon this principle, if a man does violence to the law of God, he is under obligation to make satisfaction for the violation committed. This obligation he is bound to fulfill according to the tenor and spirit of the law.

As the reward of a perfect obedience to the Divine law is life, so the penalty for disobedience is death. That death which is the penalty of the law is something more than the mere death of the body, as the Scriptures clearly prove. But how much is included in the penal death, or necessarily results from it, is not easily comprehended, and I shall not in this place attempt to specify its nature or define its extent. It is sufficient for our present inquiry to say that every sinner is under obligation, which he can not avoid, to suffer its infliction, as that is due from him to the authority of a violated law. Suppose, then, that this death is inflicted upon a personal transgressor: he has no power to restore himself again to life, and consequently he must remain forever in a state of death; for he is a sinner still, and his sin still remains upon himself. The law has no power to deliver him from death; and he has no power to deliver himself, and so must continue forever the subject of a violated law. Moreover, he still possesses all the powers of his moral and intellectual constitution, with all their functions, activities, and capabilities, and is therefore still under obligation to render a prefect obedience that the law requires. But his moral nature is depraved. He is alienated from his God, and averse to the holiness of the law, so that he continues to be the enemy of God, and remains an actual sinner. In this condition it is morally impossible that he can ever render that perfect obedience to the holy requirement of the law which is due to it. And the penalty of the law still lying upon him, it is impossible that he can ever remove that penalty. He may endure the penalty by abiding still in a state of death. But what the sinner needs, is that the penalty should be removed from him, that he may not suffer it. Bound under the iron fetters of inflexible justice, he can not do any thing, less or more, towards making satisfaction to the injured authority of the law. But nothing short of a full and complete satisfaction--a finished satisfaction for his sin--can ever constitute an atonement.

Hence we must look to a substitute for atonement--to one who will make the required satisfaction for us, in our room, in our behalf--to one who will assume our liabilities, and take our place under the law, and endure the penalty in our stead. This is what is called vicarious suffering. The substitute must suffer that death which we would have to suffer, if the substitute were not to suffer it for us.

The doctrine of substitution has been carried by some beyond its legitimate bounds. At least, so far as it is an essential element in the atonement of Christ, they have assigned to it a place where it can have no real application. Perhaps we may notice this hereafter. Others have denied the whole doctrine of atonement; but these require no notice, further than what the general discussion will supply. There are others, again, who profess to hold the doctrine of substitution, but explain it in such a way as virtually excludes it from the work of atonement.

The fact that the atonement made by the death of Christ was made for and in behalf of sinners, is so explicitly testified in the Scriptures as to foreclose all reasoning to the contrary. We will select a few texts in proof: "Christ died for us." For--that is, in the place of. "Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust." This is too plain to need comment. "I lay down my life for the sheep." "Who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree." We might add to these a great many others, but I shall take it for granted that these are sufficient.

Of the Justice of Vicarious Sufferings.

The question, How can it be just for the innocent to suffer for the guilty? is an inquiry which will naturally arise in the mind of many who are seeking to attain to clear views of the doctrine of atonement; and this is the place, in the order of discussion, for its consideration. As I do not pretend to be able to give my reader a satisfactory solution of this problem, I would prefer to pass it, for the present, without comment, and treat it in a separate article at the close; but as I can not make a reasonable excuse for such a detachment, I will proceed now to give my reader the result of some of my reflections on this profound ethical question. I must invoke the reader's patience, as I may dwell on this topic a little longer than he would expect. I shall endeavor to be as brief and concise as the nature of the inquiry will permit; but if I were preparing a separate work on atonement, I should probably treat this question considerably more at length than I design to do here. And I suppose it may be possible that some of my thoughts may not have occurred to the mind of every reader; and it would give me pleasure to cast one ray of light on this subject into the mind of the reader, as I rejoice in every accession that any Christian can make to his knowledge of Christ. I do not claim the ability to solve the question, or to explain the mystery, but I will simply present some of my own thoughts on the subject, leaving their confirmation, or their refutation, to such as are farther advanced in the knowledge of this branch of gospel doctrine than I am.

But before I enter directly upon the main question, I wish to impress a few things on the mind of the reader, because they are impressed on my own mind.

1. If there is mystery which we can not understand in a doctrine, or if we can not see its consistency with another doctrine known to be true, we are not, therefore, at liberty to reject it, because all the difficulty may be referred to our own limited powers of comprehension.

2. In reasoning upon any one perfection of the Divine nature, we are not to make ourselves absolutely certain that our deductions are necessarily correct. In order to do this, it would be necessary to understand all that is contained in that perfection, which, with us, is impossible. And more than this: All the perfections of the Godhead are mutually and intimately related to each other, and hence it might possibly be necessary that we should understand all these relations before we would be justifiable in pronouncing our conclusion indubitably correct, except where we have sufficient evidence from other sources to sustain them.

3. If we find a doctrine plainly taught in the Scriptures which appears to us to be inconsistent with any one of the Divine attributes, we must yield to the Scriptures, and not be guided by our deductions from abstract truth, which may be, and frequently are, fallacious. The testimony of God's word must, in all cases, be accepted as paramount and decisive

4. The union of the Divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ is such an inconceivable mystery to us that we are not competent to affirm or deny respecting the moral nature and the moral relations of a constitution which so far exceed all our powers of comprehension, and especially one to which in its most vital point there is no analogy.

5. The essential characteristics of eternal justice, so far as justice governs the relations of men, both to God and to each other, are sufficiently made known to us as the subjects of administrative justice; but there may be a great deal included in Divine justice which it is not possible or needful for us, in our present condition, to understand; and in the great transaction now under consideration, the Son of God is not constitutionally a subject of administrative justice. He assumed this state of subjection, and He is the only being in existence who could be injuriously affected by the substitution, whether just or unjust.

6. We, as the subjects of law and administrative justice, are accountable beings to superior authority; but the Son of God is supreme, and accountable to no other authority, for there is none above Him to whom He can be responsible. All the obligation that He can possibly be under, is that obligation which He is under to His own Godhead; and therefore He has a sovereign right to do and submit to all that is according to His own sovereign will. And we may rationally suppose that the principles of justice, in their application to subordinate and accountable creatures, may not be applicable, in every respect to a supreme and independent being.

7. It may be said, that if that is just in the Divine administration which is inconsistent with and even contrary to all our ideas of human justice, how can we arrive at any true knowledge of the Divine character? To this we may reply, that other attributes of the Divine nature are equally inconsistent with our notions of those attributes, and consequently are equally liable to the same objection. For example. Our world is full of misery, distress, and almost every variety and decree of suffering. How can this be consistent with the infinite mercy of God, when it is, and ever has been within the power of God to prevent it? We are therefore, authorized to say, that we may know the true character of God, but we can not know His whole character. True, there is mystery: but if there was no mystery, we could not know the true character of God; for mystery to finite creatures is necessarily inseparable from an infinite nature. We know from the word of God that He is just, and that Christ suffered, without any sin of His own, the just for the unjust. This should be received in implicit faith. And it is not wisdom, but presumption, to inquire into the mysteries of the Godhead further than He has seen good to reveal them. And perhaps it may not be impertinent to remark, that if this mystery in the justice of God had been clearly revealed to our understanding, for aught that we know it might have disclosed another mystery beyond that equally as much above our comprehension, and perhaps still more repugnant to our pride. "Be still, and know that I am God."

Can it be just that the innocent should suffer that the guilty may escape? This is in substance the form in which the question meets us; and the answer is supposed to be intuitive--that it is not just; hence it is presented as a formidable objection to the atonement made by the vicarious death of Christ. But this form of stating the question is not fair; it embraces two distinct questions. I must therefore protest against this complication. In discussing a subject--such a one as the subject now in hand--the prime point of inquiry ought to be disencumbered of every thing that does not essentially belong to it. That the question in the above form contains two distinct questions, is evident: 1. Can it be just that the innocent should suffer? 2. Can it be just that the guilty should go unpunished ? If we would attempt a logical investigation of our subject, these questions should be treated separately, and should by no means be blended into one. If it should be admitted that it may be just that the innocent should suffer under the administration of law, the whole question is disposed of at once. For what purpose the sufferings are inflicted, or on whose account they are endured, or what particular benefit may thereby accrue to others, have nothing to do with the justice or the injustice of the principle; and though it may be a moment's digression, I must remark that I never hear any complaint of injustice because the guilty is allowed to escape the just punishment due to his sin. And yet the integrity and the honor of Divine justice is as much involved in the one transaction as in the other. There is as much difficulty and as much mystery in the one question as in the other, and we are as much bound to answer the one as the other. The objector, by imputing injustice to substitutional suffering, necessarily incurs the burden of defending the remission of penalty from the imputation of injustice; and in this he never can succeed while he adheres to his objection. By answering the latter question, the objector will furnish the materials of an answer to the former; and if they were required to withhold their objection till they had complied with their own obligation, it is probable we should never hear of such schemes of atonement as some that have been ushered into the world. They may appeal to the mercy of God; but let it be remembered that there is no mercy in the treasures of Divine grace that can be exercised at the expense of Divine justice. Such an appeal would have no relevancy, and would leave the question of justice untouched.

I will now repeat, that in considering the question of the injustice of substitutional suffering, the fact that the guilty are exempted does not affect the merits of the question. If our object is to arrive at the truth as nearly as we can, we must bring the subject of inquiry as nearly as possible to a single point; and the question will be, Can it be just that the innocent should suffer under the administration of law? The question reduced to this simple form might seem to divest the object of inquiry of any complications that would embarrass our investigation, but in reality it does not. That specific object which we now have in view subjects the question to still further limitations, unless we will consent to hamper ourselves forever with entanglements that have no necessary connection with the precise object of inquiry.

The question, so far as we have any concern with it, is properly a theological question, and the solution does not strictly belong to the principles of mere ethical science. It is therefore our privilege to leave the realm of metaphysics, and discuss the doctrine exclusively in the light of theology. We should have nothing to do with it in any other point of view than as it relates to the vicarious death of the Son of God. This death is an isolated event in the Divine administration. The whole history of the Divine government, so far as men can have any knowledge of it, furnishes no similar event. The case is absolutely unique; and if we will contemplate with any reasonable attention the elements of this transaction we shall not fail to see that it is not possible that there should be any analogy. We therefore do injustice to the subject if we consent to canvass it in any other way than as it respects that one event. We must take this one isolated fact as it is, and confine our discussion of the question to the bearing it has on that one specific case. There is no need to deal in abstractions.

If the question is propounded, whether a law in a human government requiring the infliction of a prescribed penalty for crime on an innocent subject instead of the one that was guilty, I should have no objection to an answer in the negative; for even if the suffering substitute endured the penalty voluntarily, I should think a just law would not admit of such substitution, nor allow the penalty to be inflicted. But there would be no analogy between such a case and the vicarious sufferings of Christ; for, in the first place, the substitute, though voluntary, has no right to dispose of himself in that way. He would do an act which would be wrong in its own nature. He would virtually take the administration of the law in his own hands, which he has no right to do. God has invested no man with a right to sacrifice his own life in order to save the life of a criminal; the act would be suicide. Again: If the substitute dies, he can do no more for himself, or for his government, or for any one else. He can not rise from the dead. All that he accomplishes by his death is the release of a guilty criminal from merited condemnation. And again: Men are equals, and all stand in the same relation to the law; neither the substitute nor the criminal stand in any other or higher relation to the law than that of subjects. But in the matter of the substitutional death of Christ, the conditions are very different. The want of parallelism is so great that we can not reason logically from one to the other. And yet some persons seem to take no notice of this want of analogy and use the figure as if the cases were in all respects similar. I can not think they do justice to the subject. All the advantage we can derive from analogy is merely partial and incidental. If we seek for light on the substitutional atonement of Christ, we must examine it on its own merits, and confine ourselves to such principles and conditions as the case itself will supply, adhering to the guidance of Divine revelation. The plausibility of the objection, in a mere ethical point of view, should not intimidate us in the least; because we are not dealing with an abstract principle, but canvassing a specific case brought out in a given fact--a fact involving great and important considerations, which may verify that the abstract principle has no just application to the case.

We should keep in view, also, that individual personal rights are limited by the rights of others, and this is the only limitation. It is the privilege of every man to exercise his rights--those rights with which the Creator has endowed him--to whatever extent he pleases, provided he does not invade the rights of others. If a man performs an act by which the rights of no other being are infringed--if there is injustice in the deed, the injustice must be confined to himself; that is, be only is affected or injured by it. But the Creator has given no man the right to injure himself. Man is God's property, and if a man murders himself, or is designedly accessory to his own death, or willfully does himself a personal injury, he infringes the paramount rights of the Creator.

It must also be admitted that it is a moral impossibility that God should do any thing that is not in strict accordance with His nature; for as is His nature, so of necessity is His will; and He can not put forth His power only as He wills to do it.

We say that the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was innocent, suffered the penalty of the law as a substitute in the place of sinners. The objector ascribes injustice to this transaction. Now, I must maintain that he is bound to show wherein this injustice consists. It is not pretended that any injustice is done to God as Lawgiver and Judge; neither is there injustice done to those for whom He suffered as a substitute, for they are immensely benefited by it. It is evident that if injustice is done to any person, it must be done to the suffering party; and if there is any force in the objection, or if it has any just application to the case, it must apply to Christ, and to Him only. Then the question before us is simply this:

Was Christ, in dying as a substitute for sinners, the victim of injustice ?

I propose now to submit to the candid reader the result of some of my reflections on this subject, not pretending to give a complete and satisfactory answer to the question, and thus remove it out of the field of controversy. In presenting my thoughts on this subject to your consideration, I must be permitted to direct your attention to the original purpose and to the ultimate end of that economy of which this great transaction was an important and an essential part. I can not do justice to the view which I take of the subject without this; and I think also they shed their light on the whole field of inquiry. If we leave out these considerations, I can not see how we can ever attain to a clear view of the general subject, and especially of the particular topic of the present discussion. For the sake of brevity, I must consent to forego my wishes in two respects: On some of the particular topics I would gladly extend my remarks further than I design to do; and also I would like to refer to certain scriptures, which I think would sustain the views offered to your reflection.

God is what He is by the necessity of His own nature; and being infinitely perfect in His essential nature, whatever He designs or purposes must be perfect, for nothing that is imperfect can originate in or emanate from His infinite perfection. And, as all His purposes originate in Himself, so they all terminate in Him. As He is the first cause, so He is the last end of all that He purposes and of all that He does. If, then, we inquire what is the ultimate end of all that He purposes and performs, the answer is, the manifestation of His own glory; or, (to express the idea in different forms,) it is to make known what He is--to reveal His own nature. This manifestation of Himself, considered in its relation to us, is made that we may know Him, that we may know what He is, that we may know His true character.

God, in His word, has revealed Himself to us as One God, subsisting in three Persons--the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The three are the same, co-essential, co-eternal, co-equal Godhead. In this triune God there is one will, one purpose, one way, and one end in all things, to the glory of the One God. This trinity of persons in the Godhead is an incomprehensible mystery to us, but God has revealed to us the fact that it is so; and He has further revealed to us that, in accomplishing this great end--to wit, the manifestation of His glorious character--He would do all things by and through the Son of God, who is Christ the Lord. "All things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made that was made." "For by Him were all things created that are in the heavens and in the earth, visible and invisible; whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him and for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." The ground that we should take here is, that God has a sovereign and Divine right to make known to His intelligent creatures the excellency and infinite fullness of His nature; also, that He has the same Divine and supreme right to make this manifestation of Himself by and through His co-equal Son, who is one with the Father ; and further, that the Son of God, as one with the Father, possesses in Himself, by virtue of His own supreme Divinity, the same right to make this manifestation according to the sovereign will of the eternal Godhead. Moreover, God had a Divine and eternal right to make this manifestation of Himself in whatever way it might be consistent with His sovereign will. We say further, that there is but one nature, but one will, and but the one purpose in the Godhead. And if the Son of God, as the great Actor in accomplishing the Divine purpose, either on the ground of necessity or propriety, chose to unite His Divine nature with the nature and form of any of His creatures, He had a sovereign and Divine right to do so; for He has a right to enter into whatever relations to His creatures He pleases; and He creates all things, and upholds all things, and works all things according to the counsel of His own will. All things, therefore, must be subordinated to Him and under His sovereign control, or He would not be in a condition to fulfill the great office of a perfect Revealer of the Divine perfection. And all that is comprehended and intervenes between the original purpose and the final consummation of the great design, must be subjected to Him, in order to enable Him to make that manifestation of the Divine character which is the ultimate end in view. Hence all that He has made in creation, and all that He does in His providence, or in the operations of nature, are only a system of means by which He is to make known to intelligent creatures the infinite perfection of the Godhead; and He has a sovereign right to employ them for that end, according to His own good pleasure.

And as He, the Supreme, had in Himself an inherent and sovereign right to dispose of and use all those means which He had created and ordained for that designated purpose, according to His will, in the prosecution of the appointed end, so He had a right to dispose of Himself in any way that might be necessary in subserviency to this determinate end. And being Himself the Supreme, He could be under obligation to no being but Himself; and this obligation to Himself--or to the Godhead, which is the same--in relation to this ultimate end, bound Him (so to speak) to manifest the all-fullness of the incomprehensible and invisible God to His intelligent creatures; and in order that the all-fullness of the Divine nature might be seen in Him, it was necessary that all the fullness of the Godhead should dwell in Him personally. I suppose the representations here made will not be contested; and if, in the exercise of those rights and perfections, the rights of no other being are infringed, and He does no injustice to Himself, it seems to me that the impeachment of injustice must fall to the ground. We will therefore proceed to inquire further.

The Son of God, in whom resided all the fullness of the Godhead, manifested the glory of His power when He created or brought into existence the original matter of this earth and of the whole universal material creation. In this work there was a most conspicuous and demonstrative exhibition of Divine power. When He proceeded further to organize and diversify this material substance into its present forms, varieties, adaptations, and uses, and thus prepare it to be the habitation of His intelligent creatures of the human race, we see a wonderful manifestation, not only of His power, but also of His wisdom and His goodness. Again, when He declared His holy law, which be had ordained for the observance and for the good of His intelligent creatures, He then manifested the holy nature of the Divine Lawgiver; and by annexing a righteous penalty for transgression, and promising life on condition of a perfect obedience, He made known to us that He is a God of perfect justice.

We are authorized by the Holy Scriptures to believe that a part of His intelligent creatures of the angelic order did actually violate His law, and thus subject themselves to its dreadful penalty, and in consequence are doomed to irrecoverable ruin, and must suffer under the administration of punitive justice without redemption, in order that the Divine justice may be manifested to the glory of God. Thus we see that the Son of God is making greater and greater manifestations of the glory of the Divine character.

In the case of the apostate angels we see an exhibition of that inflexible justice that knows no mercy, and can not relax, or mitigate, or dispense with the least tittle of its demands; for if it could it would not be perfect justice. The honor of Divine justice must be maintained if its vindication should involve the whole creation in ruins. And when we consider the superior excellency of this high order of intelligent creatures, and that no merciful provision is made for their deliverance from the unrelenting hand of offended justice, nor any alleviation of their desperate and wretched condition, we may assure ourselves that if creatures of an inferior order should follow their example of disobedience, that Divine justice will require a satisfactory vindication equally ample, and every way commensurate with its injured honor.

We will now suppose (which is a solemn fact) that the human race should cast off their original character of holiness--should refuse obedience to God--transgress His holy law, and, of course, incur the penalty, which is death. We have just now had an example of the imperative requirements of Divine justice in the case of the rebellious angels; and justice is the same, whether it respects angels or men. Thus guilty man falls into the hands of violated justice, which can not be defied and trampled upon with impunity; for if it might, the Son of God, whose office it is to administer the Divine government, would fail to manifest the glory of His justice. And, unless the honor of justice is vindicated, man must forever abide under the wrath of God, that the rights of justice may be maintained.

But let us now lay down another supposition--one which is equally true with the former. Suppose, then, that it is a part of the great purpose of God, in making known the glory of His Name, that He will make a new and additional display of all the perfections of His Divine nature beyond any thing that has ever preceded it; and in doing this, that He will show that His wisdom is sufficient to make a way whereby the rights of justice shall remain inviolate, while He will extend redeeming mercy to the transgressors of His law. This work belongs to the Son of God, not only by appointment, but of necessity; for it is by Him that all the purposes of God are executed. And I must be allowed to believe that there was no other being in existence, created or uncreated, that was competent to the work; none other who possessed those inherent constitutional qualifications which were essential to the great achievement. He, being a Divine person, is independent of all other beings. He has a sovereign right to do His own will. He is accountable to none. He is under no obligation to any other being than Himself. He possesses a Divine right to dispose of and use all things that He has created according to His own good pleasure--subject only to that obligation which He owes to Himself to maintain inviolate all His perfections. He, therefore, had an independent and Divine right to assume human nature, and thus unite the Divine and human natures in His one person. This right I suppose no one will question; and in the exercise of this right He did make Himself one with man, born of a woman, and made under the law, that He might redeem them that were under the law. Let us spend a moment in considering the import of this text. He was not made one with man in such a sense as to be a partaker of the sinfulness of man's fallen nature; but in such a way as that, by uniting both natures in His one person, He was God and was man. But His Divinity was not made humanity, nor His humanity made Divinity; but both natures, in all their fullness, and in all their respective perfections, were united in His one person. The object in view was that He might redeem them that were under the law. To do this it was necessary that He should Himself be made under the law; and that He might be made under the law it was necessary that He should be made (born) of a woman; and thus deriving His human nature immediately from a descendant of Adam, He partook of the original constituted nature of man. And it should not be entirely overlooked that this uniting of the two natures is, in various places, ascribed to Christ himself, as being His own work. All this He had a supreme right to do; and in doing it He did not in the least impair any of His own rights, or trespass on the rights of any other being. It is, therefore, not possible that there could be any injustice in these transactions. But, to save the time, I forbear to show how both God and man are abundantly glorified in it.

The language employed in this text by the Holy Spirit--He was "made under the law"--clearly implies that previously He was not under the law in the same sense that He was made under it. The object to be accomplished was a declarative manifestation that the glory of God's grace could be revealed in the redemption of the guilty, while the honor of His justice should sustain no disparagement. As we have said before, the Son of God was under obligation to Himself--to the Godhead--to manifest, or make known, the glorious perfections of the Divine nature. And, as part of this work was to demonstrate that God is "a just God and a Savior"--a Savior of sinners--He was under the same obligation to do and to suffer all that was required to fulfill this condition. The Captain of our salvation must be made perfect through sufferings, and the Scripture gives reasons for this; consequently He must be made in the likeness of sinful flesh. This condescension appears to have been an indispensable condition; and the point of inquiry is, Did the Divine nature suffer any injustice in this part of His work? I shall not make it a question now whether the Divinity of the Son of God endured any pain in making atonement; but for the present I will take it for granted that it did not; and leaving that question to be decided as it may, I will only remark here that if any can bring proof that the Divinity of Christ suffered, I think I can bring equally as good proof that there was no injustice in His suffering. And this is all that the present inquiry demands. The only respect in which injustice can be chargeable on the ground of His condescension, is that it seems to require that the infinitely glorious Majesty of heaven and earth should be obliged to stoop from His high pre-eminence to the low degree of uniting Himself with human nature that He might suffer death. If there is any injustice in this arrangement, it respects His Divine dignity only. But we are very incompetent judges of what the Divine dignity requires; and that which is glory in God's esteem men would account shame; and, in fact, the humiliation of Christ was an illustrious manifestation of Divine grace: "That He might show in the ages to come the exceeding riches of His grace in His kindness toward us in Christ Jesus." In His humiliation He made a more glorious demonstration of the excellency of His gracious character than could have been possible if He had never "made Himself of no reputation, and taken upon Him the form of a servant, and become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." And all this He did Himself. He voluntarily took the burden on Himself. He willingly bore it Himself, and He receives the reward in that He has glorified Himself. And now, who can point out the injustice that is done to the Son of God?

We must now inquire whether there was any injustice done to the humanity of the Son of God by His enduring the sufferings necessary to make atonement for sin. Perhaps the whole question hinges upon this point; but it must be remembered that I have not promised to solve this mystery. All I profess to do is to submit some of my own thoughts on the subject to your reflection. If I could show that the claims of Divine justice against the sinner were fully canceled by the atonement, and that no injustice was suffered by Him who made it, this would vindicate the transaction from the imputation of injustice. The first of these positions, I suppose, will be admitted; for if the claims of justice in this respect are not satisfied, there is no atonement--whatever else was done, there is no atonement.

I submit that the penalty of the law is death; and that the death of Jesus Christ, as a surety and substitute for sinners, is a full and sufficient satisfaction to the penal demands of the law. But could the human nature of the Lord Jesus receive the inflicted penalty without being the victim of injustice? I shall freely confess, that if the suffering was inflicted against the will of the suffering party, I can not see the justice of such a transfer of the penalty. And perhaps it would not be safe to affirm that the mere consent of the substitute, irrespective of other considerations, would make it just. On the other hand, it might be going too far to affirm, that with the free consent of the substitute, there would be any injustice done to him. And I doubt whether any man can show that the willingness and voluntary assumption of the suffering party, wholly free from any external force or influence, does not effectually repel the imputation of injustice. But in my present attempt I have no need to avail myself of any advantage that I might derive from this argument.

As there is a great difference between the guilty and the innocent, in respect to character and condition, so we think there must be a difference in the application of the principles of administrative justice in the two cases--a difference arising from, and corresponding with, the difference of character and condition. The execution of the penalty of the law on the guilty transgressor is punishment for crime; but on the innocent substitute, though it is suffering, it is not strictly punishment. So it is correct to say, that the innocent suffered for the guilty; but, in strictness, it is hardly correct to say that the innocent was punished for the guilty; and although the penalty of the law is the same in its application in both cases, yet the principle of administrative justice may, perhaps, be different according to the different relations in which the two cases stand to the demands of strict justice.

If the sinner suffers the penalty of the law in his own person, when the death penalty is inflicted, there is no hope beyond death. He must lie under the terrors and despair of death forever. There is no possibility of regaining life; and there can be no deliverance, because there is no way of deliverance. And, further, he has no reward; he receives no compensation for his sufferings. But this is far--very far from being the case with regard to the infliction of the penalty of the law on the human nature of Jesus Christ. He had the fullest assurance, that if He should pass through the ordeal of death without sin, that He would rise again--rise to an eternal life, over which death could have no power. He laid down His life that He might take it again. So the Psalmist, speaking in the person of Christ: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption. Thou wilt show me the path of life." "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." "He shall swallow up death in victory." If He chose, (not merely submitted, or consented, but freely chose,) by suffering death, to exchange a natural and mortal life for a life that is spiritual and immortal, and beyond the power of death, it is not easy to see any inconsistency with the principles of justice in the transaction, inasmuch as He was an immense gainer by it. The sufferings of death, however great, were soon terminated; but the glory and joys of His new life endure forever and ever. Perhaps (and I think it probable) He could realize in his own case what the apostle says of Christians: "These light afflictions, which are but for a moment, work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." I presume that no man can show that his new life is not much more than a full compensation for undergoing death. But this is not all that I have to say on this principle.

As it was the office and great prerogative of the Son of God, as such, to manifest the supreme excellency and infinite perfection of the Divine nature, so the fulfillment and consummation of this purpose was the great object that He had in view in every thing that He did; and with a view to the accomplishment of this great end, He created all things as a means to be employed by Him in the execution of this grand design. And He so constituted them that they should be adapted to this purpose; and especially man was created for this end, and constitutionally endowed with a capacity and fitness for the purpose, according to the peculiar place which he was to fill in the great plan of manifestation. For this purpose man was created in the image of God; he was endowed with all the moral perfections of his Creator, so far as it was possible for human nature to be. And now we will look at him in this character of moral perfection; and as we suppose the human nature of Jesus Christ was in all respects the very same as that of Adam in his original creation, and therefore might, with the utmost propriety, be called the "second Adam," we will consider the moral perfections of Christ as a man. He was holy in all His moral nature; we are the subjects of moral depravity and corruption. There is not an attribute of our moral nature that is not debased, contaminated, and averse from God. As we have attempted to show in a preceding part of this work, our moral nature is totally corrupted by sin; but this was not so in respect to the human nature of the Son of God. God's will was His will. The will of the Divine nature of the Son of God and the will of the human nature were the same. Whatever was pleasing to the Divine nature was pleasing to the human nature; whatever was the delight of the Son of God to do, or submit to, was also the delight of the Man Christ Jesus to do; also, whatever was the unvarying purpose of His Divine will was also the unvarying purpose and intent of His human will. And as it was the determinate purpose of the Son to manifest the glory of the Divine character in every way and by every means possible, so it was the constant aim and purpose and the paramount desire of His human nature to do the same thing. In respect to both His natures He could say, "I delight to do Thy will, O my God." The will and purposes and the actings of the human nature were in perfect unison with the will and purposes and the doings of the Divine nature; and as the ultimate end of all was that God should be glorified, if the Divine Son, in doing this, in the exercise of His sovereign right as such, without any injustice to Himself or to any other being, chose to become poor, and to humble Himself by assuming human nature, that in that nature He might suffer death, so we may conceive that the human nature, in the exercise of His right, and actuated by the same will and desire with the Divine nature, might voluntarily, and without any injustice to Himself or to any other being, choose to submit to suffering and death, that He might thereby glorify God, and thus answer the great end for which human nature was originally created; for man, as such, has rights peculiar to his nature and relations, which it is his privilege to exercise according to his own good pleasure; and with those rights none have a right to interfere but his Creator, who invested him with those rights; and if they are exercised in obedience to the will of God, there can be no interference. No man has a right to deprive another of his life, provided he has not forfeited his life according to the law of God. And we admit that God has not given to man a right to divest himself of life; but God has a sovereign right to take from every man that life which He gave him. I do not say that He has a right to make His innocent and obedient creatures miserable, for He can not do injustice to any of His creatures; but as He gave life to every living thing, He has a right (if it were His will) to take it away from the living. Yet it is the prerogative of God to invest any of His innocent creatures--any innocent man--with a right to surrender his life in any way, in obedience to the known will of God. He may confer this additional right upon whom He pleases; and this right He did confer upon Jesus Christ, who was the Son of man and the Son of God. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power (authority) to lay it down, and I have power (authority) to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father." Independently of inductive reasoning, this passage appears to establish the position that the Father did confer upon Jesus this special and peculiar right to dispose of His life for a special purpose, and gave Him assurance that He should not remain under the power of death. Now, as He possessed in Himself, and by divine authority, a right to receive that infliction of the penalty which was due to sinners, and no one else could be injuriously afflicted by it, I am not able to see how a charge of injustice can be imputed to the transaction. But when we proceed to take into view the objects and results of the atonement thus made, in relation to Himself, all appearance of injustice, in a practical point of view, seems to disappear. For with Him, (I speak of Him as a man,) His great object, purpose, and desire, in His life and death, was the glory of God--that God might be glorified in extending mercy to sinners, while His justice should remain unimpeachable. This paramount desire he realized, and will forever rejoice, with a joy inconceivable by us, that, in suffering the penalty of the law for sinners, He was the means of advancing the declarative glory of God far beyond any other exhibition of His glorious character that had ever before been made. If He, with all the willingness and zeal of which His nature was capable, chose to endure temporary suffering and death, (however great the suffering might be for the time,) that He might be instrumental in achieving the most glorious object that even God Himself has in view, who will attach the character of injustice to that economy under which He suffered? And, as a part of His reward, He became capacitated for a measure of enjoyment incomparably greater than He otherwise would have been capable of; and He is now, and ever will be, filled with a joy which no mortal man could sustain. Our mortal constitution would be overborne by the burden. The consciousness that He has the full approbation of His God--that God is well pleased with the sacrifice He made and the service He rendered--will inspire His soul with a holy ecstasy exceeding in measure any thing experienced by the highest order of angelic creatures. Thus He, "for the joy set before Him, endured the cross." What a measureless compensation!

Again: When He shall have finished His work on earth, and the whole general assembly and church of the First-born, in a glorified state, shall be gathered into the heavenly sanctuary above, He may look around and survey the innumerable millions of glorified saints, all rapt in the fullness of heavenly ecstasy, and brought thither through the suffering He endured, and as the fruits of His death. "The grain can not bring forth fruit except it die:" and Jesus died and rose again, and now beholds the immeasurable fruits of His humiliation. Who shall attempt to estimate the boundless joy which the contemplation of the scene around Him will inspire? A great "multitude which no man can number," of the sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty, all brought into this high relation and exalted to this glorious eminence through His obedience unto death. These are a part of "the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints." They are a part of His reward, for they are the purchase of His blood.

There is yet one more consideration to which I must direct the reader's attentions--a consideration infinitely worthy of our highest thoughts, and which ought to inspire every soul with ineffable joy. It is that boundless glory which is conferred upon our suffering Substitute, as a part of the reward due to His humiliation and death. On this topic we can not enlarge. The subject is, in itself, so high above all the powers of human conception, that our best thoughts shrink into insignificance. He is clothed with "all power in heaven and earth." All his enemies are subdued under His feet. He is made the "Head over all things," and "crowned with glory and honor"--"angels, and authorities, and powers, being made subject to Him." How clear, how explicit, is the following testimony: "And being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father." This needs no comment. None but an inspired pen can express the infinite height of glory to which He who died on the cross is exalted; and thus exalted because He "became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." All the angels of God are required to worship Him; and their obedience is both their glory and their joy.

In conventional transactions between men, when both parties fully understand all the interests involved on both sides, if the stipulated consideration is equal in value to the condition required, there is no fraud--there is no injustice. And taking into view all that the Scriptures fully warrant us in setting down as the reward of our Redeemer's sufferings, and who will take upon him to say that the consideration is not equal to the condition? "He shall see of the travail of His soul and shall be satisfied." If there is any injustice in the whole transaction, we have a right to inquire to what point in the transaction does the injustice attach? It must of necessity relate to the suffering party; it can apply to no other. No other being in existence can receive damage or be injuriously affected by it. He had a sovereign right to do what He did, in its relation to Himself as the suffering party; and in doing what He did, He infringed the right of no other being whatever. He that will object to the vicarious sufferings of Christ on the ground of injustice, should look well to see where he will find materials to support his objections.

The mere abstract question, Is it just that the innocent should suffer for the guilty? is one which we are not obliged to answer. The guilt of the person for whom the innocent suffers, has no concern with the justice or injustice of the suffering. Let us propose another question: Is it just that the innocent should suffer for the innocent? As to the injustice, it would be the same in one case as in the other. But neither can be made to comprehend the vicarious sufferings of Christ. The question in that case would more properly be: Can it be just that an innocent person should suffer under law, provided he receives a plenary compensation for his sufferings? I believe that no man can prove the negative; and if the affirmative be admitted, the question will then necessarily occur, Is it true that our Redeemer is amply rewarded for the sacrifice He made for our redemption? Now, as both the sufferings and the reward are great beyond all our powers of comprehension, we may not be able to give a positive and unqualified answer to this question by any comparison that we can make between the two, yet we think the testimony of God's word is fully sufficient to authorize an affirmative answer; and unless the objector can prove the negative, he is not entitled to advance the objection.

It is too often represented as if Divine justice, in pursuing the sinner, is made to turn out of its proper course in order to find a substitute, and seizes upon our Surety. This is not so. This is misrepresentation--unintentional, no doubt. Justice pursues its own legitimate course. Infinite mercy can not turn it aside. The immaculate holiness of the Son of God can not turn it aside. Justice (so to speak) was bent upon an equitable vindication of its injured rights and honor--its legitimate course was direct toward the sinner. Christ our Surety took our sins upon Himself, and voluntarily interposed His own person in the way of avenging justice, and rendered in full the required satisfaction; then justice, being satisfied, pursues the sinner no further. There was no such thing as justice being turned out of its due course to fall on our Substitute. But Christ, our Substitute, voluntarily threw Himself under the ministration of wrath. If He suffered injustice, would it be too much to say that He was Himself the author of His own injury? It would appear to accord very well with what is written: "He gave Himself for us." "I lay down my life for the sheep." He offered up Himself.

It is a principle of natural law that we may voluntarily and innocently submit to labor, or endure suffering, with an assurance of securing an adequate reward; and though it may not be worthy of being called an argument, I might appeal to a natural sentiment in the mind of man, whether if he could live always here in this world, and be exempted from the pains and troubles incident to humanity, but by voluntarily suffering death, with a certainty of being immediately raised to an eternal life, in a state incomparably and inconceivably better than would be possible in this life--whether he would not judge the latter preferable? Neither would he suppose that he would inflict upon himself any injustice or violate any principle of moral right.

In thus presenting my thoughts on this question, I have not assumed the task of solving the question or explaining the mystery. I hope I have more correct views of my incompetency than to claim the ability to solve a mystery which, I believe, has repelled the approach of all our learned divines. At least, if the subject has been investigated, I am not aware of it; but I have read so few books on atonement that I am not prepared to say what has been written. My own mind having been somewhat perplexed with the question--and supposing it might be the case with others--I resolved to give it the best investigation my time and opportunities would permit. The nature and design of this treatise compelled me to be brief. If I had been preparing a separate treatise on the atonement, I should have written much more in detail than I have done, and should also have referred to a number of scriptures which appear to me to bear directly on the subject. With one more remark I leave these thoughts to the consideration of the reader. If I did not believe that my Savior would Himself receive an ample reward for what He did and suffered for His people, my spirit could not rest. Must we live in the fear that when we shall be with Him, it will be our employment to condole with Him on account of His uncompensated sufferings ?

Of the Value and Sufficiency of Atonement.

We must admit that there is a real distinction between the value of the atonement and its sufficiency. Perhaps these two topics might be treated to greater advantage by considering them separately; but they are so essentially and so intimately connected, that a frequent reference from one to the other may be almost unavoidable. We shall, therefore, discuss them in connection, while we may not lose sight of the real distinction. It is the value of the atonement which makes it acceptable in the sight of God; it is the sufficiency of the atonement which makes it available in behalf of sinners. The intrinsic value of the atonement is derived from the Divine dignity of Him whose death made atonement, and its sufficiency arises from its real value.

The Scriptures represent the infinite worth and inherent efficacy of the atonement as being derived from the fact that it was made by the death of a Divine person--namely, the Son of God: "He gave Himself for us." "Christ loved the church and gave Himself for it." "Who (Christ) gave Himself for our sins." The fact that Christ gave Himself for us as an atonement for our sins, is sufficient of itself to determine the value of the sacrifice. Hence, also, we see the frequent allusions to the relation which Christ sustained to the Father in reference to His atoning death: "The blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin." "Awake, O sword, against my Shepherd, and against the man that is my Fellow." "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." "God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh," etc. "God sent forth His Son to redeem," etc. I have no doubt that the real worth and inherent excellency of the Son of God is greater than the whole creation--may I not say, infinitely greater? As the atonement is made to God--as the price of our redemption is paid to Him in vindication of His injured law--I suppose the reader will be willing to leave it with Him to judge of its value, and will take it for granted that, as God has accepted it, there can be in it no deficiency of intrinsic merit.

And although the sufficiency of the atonement may not be a more essential and vital principle than its value, there is more danger of an erroneous estimate being put upon it; for, aside from such as may be more fundamental, a soul oppressed with a load of guilt and conscious of his just desert of Divine wrath--groping in darkness, and, as yet, seeing no way of escape--his mind full of gloomy forebodings and confusion, (and such cases do occur,) Satan may tempt him to doubt whether even the death of Christ is sufficient to answer his desperate necessity. But, again, there is an error of far more frequent occurrence, for it is almost universal--that men want to lend a little help to the death of Christ. They want to do something themselves by way of making satisfaction for past sins; or they will expect to bear some suffering themselves, either in mind or in body, to gain the favor of God. I believe it is no very uncommon thing for persons to expect to suffer in this world in order to avoid suffering in the world to come. These false views arise from putting too low an estimate on the atonement of Christ; and, indeed, the religious errors arising from an inadequate appreciation of the sufficiency of the atonement are too numerous to admit of specification in this place.

To determine the sufficiency of the atonement we must examine it in relation to the object which was to be accomplished by it, in a legal point of view. That object was to satisfy the claims of the Divine law--that is, to make complete satisfaction to Divine justice for our sins. Whatever was necessary to vindicate the integrity and honor of the Divine law, which we had transgressed, was indispensable to the sufficiency of the atonement. Nothing less would be sufficient, nothing more would be necessary, and nothing else would answer the purpose. In theological strictness, such a thing as an insufficient atonement is an impossibility; because, if it does not effectually and perfectly accomplish the object, it is not atonement. Whatever might be done, if it does not effectually and completely vindicate the justice, truth, authority, and honor of the moral law, it is a misnomer to call it atonement. The law imperatively required the infliction of the penalty--the whole penalty. That penalty is death; and death is a final fact, beyond which the law does not go. Death is also indivisible; it can not be so divided as to admit of a partial infliction.

Now, if the offering up of a dove as a sacrifice for sin would perfectly satisfy the demands of the law, such a sacrifice would be a sufficient atonement, and nothing more would be needed. On the other hand, if the sacrifice of the Son of God, and with Him the whole universal creation, visible and invisible, would not make this requisite satisfaction, it would not be sufficient--it would not be atonement in any proper sense of the word.

The sufficiency of the atonement does not depend upon the amount of the Redeemer's sufferings. It was formerly held by some that Christ suffered in exact proportion to the amount of sin or guilt which was expiated by His atonement. This is plausible, at first sight, but it is certainly an error. This theory would determine the sufficiency of the atonement by the amount of suffering that all those who are saved would have borne, provided no atonement bad been made.

If the atonement consists essentially in suffering--in the pain and agony endured by our Surety--it would be impossible to obtain any definite idea of what it really is--it would be one of the most vague and indefinite conceptions imaginable.

There is, in some respects, a true and proper analogy between commercial law and moral law, and it is allowable and right to employ this analogy in illustrating the doctrine of the atonement. The rule of commercial law is, so much of one commodity for so much of another; and strict commercial justice requires that the two shall be of equal value. We will suppose that A has injured B to the amount of one hundred dollars, and immediately repairs the damage to the full amount of the injury. This would be atonement in a commercial or pecuniary point of view. This would be exact justice, and the wrong would be rectified; and this would be practicable, because the injury and the reparation, being both of the same nature and kind, the precise equivalent is ascertainable, and B would receive all that justice would require.

But let us take another example: Suppose that A is a man universally respected, every way worthy of the high esteem of the whole community, justly deserves and actually enjoys the confidence and love of all his acquaintance; and B, by slander and falsehood, destroys his fair reputation, and brings him into universal contempt, and thus A becomes the object of public detestation and disgrace, and must live under a load of infamy, with all its attendant evils, too numerous to admit of detail: how is reparation to be made for this injury? If B, or any other for him, would give A the wealth of a kingdom, it would not repair the injury while A is still the object of scorn and contempt. No punishment that could be inflicted upon B, even if it should exceed the demerit of his crime, would redress the wrong. In fact, put both together, and all would do nothing at all towards making atonement. What, then, would answer the specific demand ? It is easy to see the imperative requirement. A must be restored to the esteem, love, and confidence which be enjoyed before he was defamed. Let the vindication be in every respect and in full measure equal to the injury. This would meet the claims of justice; this would be atonement; this would be all that A would have a right to require. And though B might still deserve all the punishment due to his crime, yet A would have all his rights; and if he obtains all his rights, it matters not whether they are restored by B, or by another in his behalf. This illustration may assist us in understanding the true nature of the atonement, as well as in ascertaining its sufficiency.

We thus bring the inquiry to a point: That which is necessary and indispensable to atonement, and to the sufficiency of atonement, is, that the claims of the law, which stood against us, should be fully met at every point, and completely canceled. The justice of the law, the authority of the law, and the honor of the law must receive an ample vindication, and this can be done in no other way than by the infliction of the penalty. All this is accomplished by the death of Christ. A plenary and perfect satisfaction has been rendered to the claims of the law by Him. Thus the law has received all its rights, and claims no more. The satisfaction has been made to the law by Him for us. In ourselves, we deserve the merited punishment, just as much as if nothing had been done. The obligation to obedience was fulfilled by our Surety, and the penalty for disobedience has been suffered by Him, and what more does the law require? It does not and can not require more. It has "recovered all."

I might enlarge my discussion of this topic to a much greater extent; I might adduce a number of arguments too strong to be successfully resisted; I might quote a number of scriptures bearing directly on the point; but as the sufficiency of the atonement of Christ is so generally admitted, I do not think it necessary to detain the reader's attention on this point. I had prepared the materials, some of which I would willingly present to your notice, but will decline it, because there are a few things having connection with the subject, to which I wish to direct your attention for a few minutes; and there will then remain one more aspect of the atonement which will demand consideration.

We have already said the value and sufficiency of the atonement does not depend upon, or consist in, the amount of the mere sufferings of Him whose death made it; but it can not be denied that both writers and speakers express themselves in language that would seem to imply that doctrine--to leave the impression on the mind that it was the greatness of the sufferings endured by our Savior that removed the curse of the law from us. If the intensity of the Redeemer's sufferings was that which constituted the value and efficacy of the atonement, then the penalty of the law is suffering--the endurance of pain; and in this view it would be difficult to defend the God of love from the imputation of delighting in the misery of His creatures. He delights in being just, and in doing justice in the administration of His government; and His justice requires that He should inflict the deserved punishment on the wicked; but this is a very different thing from taking pleasure in the miseries even of His sinful subjects, for such pleasure would inevitably imply malignity, which is no part of the Divine character.

Let us say the penalty of the law is death, and Christ suffered the penalty for us. What can be plainer and more simple than this? It is as definite and specific as any commercial transaction can be. But it is not my wish or design to depreciate the sufferings of the cross, or to reduce them within the limits of moderation, or even within the bounds of comprehension; but to guard against ascribing to the mere suffering that which is due to the power and efficacy of His triumphant death; for there is comparatively so much said about His overwhelming sufferings, and comparatively so little of His death, that there is danger of insinuating a false idea at the very point where simple truth is all-important. These sufferings are often made the theme of eloquence, and surely it is the grandest and most sublime subject, beyond comparison, upon which the powers of oratory can be employed. But transcendently great as were our Redeemer's sufferings--great beyond conception--yet there is one thing that is greater--that is, His death. The death of the Son of God is the greatest event that has ever transpired in God's universe, of which we have any knowledge. Without this, all the sufferings which the Lord Jesus underwent, or could have endured, never would have made His humiliation complete, or brought His saving hand within reach of lost sinners. This act of submission by the Lord of all, stands in pre-eminent glory above all else within the compass of time and space. If the Son of God had suffered all the pain and agony that it was possible for His Divine and human natures to sustain, without total extinction, from the hour that He was laid in the manger till this present hour, if there had been no death, there would have been no atonement. Any thing called (or miscalled) atonement that does not include the death of Christ, precludes the possibility of His resurrection and glorification, and, by consequence, the resurrection and glorification of all His saints.

All the while that I have been discoursing on this subject, I have proceeded on the ground that Christ suffered the penalty of the law. I am aware, however, that this has been denied. I am in possession of the arguments by which the opposite theory is supported; and I think I could show the inconsistency and fallacy of their reasoning. But I do not design to say much upon this topic, because I think a very little will be sufficient to make it evident that the theory can not be sustained. A late writer on atonement says: "It is not meant by the atonement that Christ endured the literal penalty of the law." If He did not endure the literal penalty, He did not endure the penalty at all, for there is no other penalty; but we will let that pass. That we have incurred the penalty of the law by our transgressions, and are liable to its infliction, needs no proof to any one that acknowledges the truth of the Scriptures; and Christ has said that not one jot or tittle of the law shall fail. Now, if Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law for his people, and they do not suffer it themselves, what becomes of the penalty? for it is manifest that it is never inflicted; and thus that part of the law which gives it its condemning power fails, or else we are still exposed to its infliction. But the apostle says there is now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus. The same author says that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law, but something else--something less. In what sense, then, were His sufferings vicarious? If He did not suffer that which we should have suffered, I am not able to see how His sufferings could be properly vicarious.

That the atonement has special respect to the law, is so abundantly taught in the Scripture as to preclude the necessity of particular reference. But if Christ, in making atonement, did not suffer the penalty of the law, we can see no connection between the atonement and the law; for it is precisely in that very point--the penalty--that the connection subsists; and if the penalty of the law may be set aside without being inflicted--merely dispensed with--the obligation may be dispensed with also, for it has lost its power to enforce its authority. Such a transaction is not atonement; it is simply a compromise--a compromise at the sacrifice of the justice of the obligation and the truth of the threatening.

But, aside from these considerations, what is the bearing that this scheme must necessarily have upon other doctrines? In what light does it place the faithfulness of God? He makes a most solemn threat, founded on a verity more stable and permanent than the heavens and the earth, and then disregards it--or, to say the best, He evades it! What now am I to think of His promises? He threatens death through the law, and fails to execute the threatening. He also promises eternal life through Jesus Christ, and may He not as easily recant His promise? I should suppose the truth of the one would be as sacred in His eyes as the truth of the other. What a precarious foundation for the believing sinner to rest upon! He can never attain to the "full assurance of faith." I might extend this argument further, but I will only say: "We are become dead to the law by the body of Christ." "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." He was "made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law."

The Extent of the Atonement.

I believe that theological writers generally speak of the extent of the atonement in its relation to the number of those for whom the atonement was made.

In bringing this subject under discussion, it will not be impertinent to make a few preparatory observations:

1. I understand by "the atonement," that satisfaction for sin which Christ, by His death, rendered to the Divine law on behalf of sinners. It is in this sense that I shall use the term, believing it to be the only proper theological meaning,

2. Any theory of atonement that does not actually and effectually secure all that for which an atonement was necessary, is essentially defective and erroneous. It must perfectly accomplish the design and all the legitimate results which it contemplates, both in its relations to God and also to men.

3. On this subject we can know nothing except what God has revealed in His word. All reasonings, except legitimate inferences from the inspired word, are worthless; all speculations and arguments drawn from the analogies of nature on the extent of the atonement are inadmissible.

4. The atonement is, in itself--in its nature, in its intrinsic merit--sufficient for the redemption of the whole family of mankind. Considered irrespective of any design in its application, it is sufficient for all the human family. If, as we have stated in our second observation, the atonement does completely fill and satisfy all its relations to God, it must be sufficient for all; for, in its relations to God, if it is not sufficient for all, it is not sufficient for one.

To the principles laid down in these observations, we shall probably have occasion to recur as we proceed.

Viewing the atonement in the light above presented, we will attempt a brief discussion of the extent of the vicarious death of Christ, in its subjective and personal relations.

It is not my intention to review every theory of atonement which has been proposed to the ignorance and credulity of the religious world; for of some of them I suppose I know nothing, and of some that have fallen incidentally under my notice I am unacquainted with the arguments by which they profess to establish or defend their systems. But I know that they do not build upon Scripture evidence, because their schemes are so utterly remote from any thing taught in the word of God that I should have to go too far out of my line to take any notice of them; and my readers will be none the worse off by remaining ignorant of them.

There are four different theories of atonement which we shall attempt to examine, and the greater part of what we shall say on the extent of the atonement will be included in the discussion of these different schemes.

1. It has been held that the death of Christ was, so much suffering for so much sin; and hence that the atonement was not only intended for the elect only, but that it was not sufficient for any more. This has been called the commercial view of atonement.

2. Another theory is, that atonement was not made for persons at all--that it was simply made for sin, irrespective of the persons who were to be made partakers of the benefit. This has been styled indefinite atonement.

3. Others maintain that the atonement is strictly personal, and that it was made for all persons--for every person, and for every one alike--and in the same respects. Not only that it is sufficient in itself for the whole race of mankind, but that it was designed for all, and for one as much as for another--for those that are lost as much as for those that are saved. This view is properly denominated a universal atonement.

[Note.--I have here stated this view of the atonement as correctly as I know how, according to my understanding of their views.]

4. Again, there are some who hold that the atonement is strictly personal; and was made specially, as atonement, for those only who will be ultimately saved, but that in its nature and inherent merit it is sufficient for the redemption of the whole world. This is called particular or special atonement.

Of these several schemes of atonement we shall discourse in the above order, and we shall endeavor, as far as we are able, to do impartial justice to each--that is, so far as I shall extend the discussion. It would be as lawful for me as for any other man to present all the arguments and scriptures at my command, on one side of the question, and leave entirely out of view such as might be alleged on the other side. But I am not sure that the Judge would approve such an ex parte examination.

l. The theory first laid down, which has been called the commercial view of atonement, was the subject of much controversy some years ago, but as I do not think it has many advocates in the present age, I shall not dwell upon it at great length. It is the most restricted scheme of any that has ever been adopted. There is something in it which appears plausible at the first sight; but it is liable to some objections, which its adherents have not been able to remove. It is objected by those who oppose it, that it is inconsistent with the universal call of the gospel. Sinners are universally invited to the blessings of the gospel, on the ground that Christ has died for sinners. If therefore, the atonement is sufficient for the elect only, and the merit and efficacy of the death of Christ are not sufficient for any more, the non-elect are invited to that which, in point of fact, has no existence. I do not see how this objection can be obviated; for if sinners are saved only through the atonement of Christ, and can not be saved in any other way, it is not even within the power of God to save any except those who will be saved. Indeed, I think we may safely extend this principle still further, even to the whole length of saying that it was not within the power of God to make any provision for the redemption of the non-elect; for I am fully persuaded that all has been done that could be done--that is, by way of atonement. God has given His well-beloved Son to become incarnate, and to die for the redemption of sinners, and what more could He give? If He had also given the whole creation in addition, it could not have added any thing to the worth and power of the death of Christ as atonement. Such a bloodless sacrifice could have accomplished nothing as a satisfaction for sin, for it had no adaptation to such an end. If I am correct in these views, it follows necessarily that it never was within the power of God to provide for the salvation of any more of the human family than what will be saved; but of any such inability on God's part, we have no hint in the Bible--the contrary seems to be every where assumed, and in many places plainly taught. In saving sinners, God acts in the freeness of His will, and not under any limitations of His power.

2. That scheme of atonement which has been termed indefinite, supposes that the atonement was not made for persons; but simply that it was made for sin, or on account of sin, without reference to sinners personally. This impersonal view of the death of the Son of God has something in it so distant, so cold and abstract, that it would require some force of evidence to make that it acceptable; nevertheless, if it could be substantiated by the word of God, it ought to be received. I object to it, in the first place, because it appears to me to exclude the love of God from atonement. It is very clearly taught in Scripture that it was because God loved us that He sent His Son to be a propitiation for our sins; and if His love was personal, the propitiation must be personal also. It is also taught, with equal clearness, that Christ died for us because He loved us. The exercises of Divine love must, of necessity, be personal; and if atonement is not personal, love is excluded.

I object to it, in the second place, because, so far as I can see, the death of Christ can not be vicarious. Any view of atonement that excludes, or does not admit, the substitutional principle as essential to a proper atonement, can never obtain my assent; but if Christ did not die for persons, His death can not be vicarious. If He died merely for sin, having no respect to personal sinners, He was either not a substitute, or He was the substitute of a mere abstraction.

I object to it, thirdly, because, so far as atonement is concerned, it excludes the mediatorship of Christ. It is an indispensable condition of mediatorial action that there should be two parties; but if Christ, in making atonement, had no respect to persons, there was but the one party. "A mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one." There is one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. That the atonement belongs to the mediatorship, admits of no debate.

There is yet a fourth objection which I must oppose to an indefinite atonement--an objection which, if tenable, would supersede the necessity of making any other; and that it is tenable, I have no doubt: I find it impossible to reconcile this indefinite scheme of atonement with a great number of scriptures. Both the meaning and the very words of Scripture contradict it. If a text speaks of the atonement, on the one hand, and, on the other, if the language is plainly personal, that is all that is necessary to prove the point. "While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." "For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son." "For even Christ, our Passover, is sacrificed for us." "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." In these passages the references to the atonement are too plain to be doubted; and that the atonement thus referred to relates to persons, is evident, for the personal pronouns we and us will admit of no other application. The attentive reader of the New Testament will find a number of others without my quoting them here.

3. Those who maintain the doctrine of universal atonement do not deny that it is personal. They hold that Christ, by His death, made atonement for the whole human family--for all and for every one, and for all alike--for one as much as for another.

To do justice to this scheme of atonement it is proper to say that it differs from the one last considered, in that it fully recognizes subjective personality. Its advocates contend that atonement was made for persons--for personal sinners. It differs also from that which is called the commercial plan of atonement. They maintain that the atonement was sufficient for the world, and also that it was designed for all. It may be proper to remark further, that the difference between this scheme of universal atonement, and the theory next to be considered, has been signified on a preceding page, and will come more fully into view as we proceed with our discussion of the general subject.

Those who advocate the doctrine of universal atonement rely (if I understand them) mainly on three sources of evidence to support their theory: 1. On arguments drawn from the analogies of nature; 2. On arguments derived from fundamental truths revealed in the Scriptures; 3. On particular texts of Scripture.

1. The arguments drawn, professedly, from the analogies of nature are so foreign, so inappropriate and inapplicable, as to be unworthy of the reader's notice. I shall therefore not tax his patience by stating them.

2. To reason from general and fundamental truths, clearly revealed in the inspired writings, is perfectly lawful; and on some subjects we have no need of more forcible and decisive arguments than legitimate deductions of this kind; but in general they require very close and critical examination, lest we should accept larger inferences than the premises will justify.

I have read comparatively but few authors on the doctrine of atonement; and of the few whose works I have examined, some appear to me to neglect the distinction between the sufficiency of the atonement and the design. That there is a real distinction, is obvious, and must be acknowledged by every one who will give the subject a little reflection; and while the writers alluded to recognize this distinction, and occasionally advert to it, yet in their arguments they seem to lose sight of it, and to interblend the two topics so much that it is scarcely possible to know to which of the two they direct their arguments.

I lay it down as a fundamental principle, that the atonement made by the death of Christ does effectually and perfectly answer all the ends and designs for which it was made. It meets and fills the whole necessity which required the intervention of an atonement. This, I suppose, will not be contested. Hence, in all its relations to God as Sovereign Lawgiver and Judge, it must be absolutely perfect and complete, both essentially and comprehensively; for any defect or deficiency would vitiate the whole transaction, and render all its contemplated results abortive.

From these considerations it must follow that the atonement, in its nature--in its intrinsic worth and merit--is sufficient for the redemption of the whole family of sinful men, provided it were the will of God to apply it to all. And not only is it a sufficient ground to admit of the salvation of all, but it must insure the certain and inevitable salvation of all to whom an application of its benefits is made; but the fact that it is in itself sufficient for all, is no proof that it was intended that all should have a personal interest in its provisions.

It would be inconsistent in the extreme, even to the point of absurdity, to suppose that the all-wise God would, at so great a sacrifice, provide an atonement for lost sinners which would not be sufficient to satisfy His own will, and competent to answer all His own purposes. And if it is conceded that, so far as an atonement was necessary, that which was made by the death of the Son of God is, in itself--in its merit and efficacy--sufficient for the necessity of all the human family, so that nothing more, by way of atonement, would be necessary, if the salvation of all were intended, it will follow that, whatever limitation there may be in its application to sinners, such restriction must depend upon the sovereign purpose of God; so that arguments to prove the sufficiency of the atonement, which would be relevant and appropriate, would prove nothing at all respecting any limitation of the design for which it was made.

1. It is thought by some that an inference may be drawn from the nature of the atonement, that it was intended to have application to all men. They allege that the atonement is just what we might suppose it would be on the supposition that it was intended for all men. Now, it is a sound maxim in logical reasoning, that "an argument that proves too much, proves nothing;" and this argument would have the same force and the same propriety if urged in favor of universal salvation. If it had been the purpose of God to save the whole human family, the nature of the atonement would be just what it is. The argument, therefore, proves too much. On the other hand, the nature and intrinsic worth of the atonement is just what it would be if it had been made for but one sinner. Whatever weight the argument might have, if employed to prove the sufficiency of the atonement, it can have no propriety of application to the design of its personal application.

Those writers who plead for a universal atonement speak of the nature of the atonement as being such that, it is applicable to all men, and as having some reference to all men; thus adopting modes of expression of the most vague and indeterminate meaning. While professing to show how far the atonement was designed to be extended in its saving relations, they only show how far (by the will of God) it might be extended; thus losing sight of the distinction between the sufficiency of the atonement and its design. To tell the reader that the atonement must have some reference to all men, will afford him very little instruction, unless I tell him that it was the purpose of God that it should have the same reference to all men alike; for this seems to be the idea they wish to convey to the reader's mind.

Some of the advocates of universal atonement admit that "if Christ endured the literal penalty of the law, the doctrine of a limited atonement must be true." Now, there is no other penalty of the law but the literal penalty; but we will waive that. But as certainly as it is the determined purpose of God to maintain the honor of His law and the truth of its threatening, so certainly the penalty of the law must fall somewhere; and if it did not fall on Jesus Christ as the sinner's substitute, it will fall on the sinner. Let every sinner--even those writers themselves--be prepared for this; for it is inevitable. Let me here propose a few questions to the reader: Is not the penalty of the law death? And did not Christ suffer death for sinners? If these should be answered in the affirmative, what perverse sophistry it is to say that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law.

2. These writers, by a similar mode of reasoning, draw the same inference from the Divine dignity of Him who made atonement; and this argument is liable to the same objections. It proves too much. The dignity of the Son of God is such that we may as rationally infer that He was as able to save eternally the whole human family as that He was able to make atonement for them; and the Universalist is as much entitled to the benefit of this argument as the believer in a universal atonement. They suppose that the idea of a universal atonement better "fits in" with the rank and dignity of Him who made it than a limited atonement. And would not a universal salvation also better "fit in" with the dignity of the Son of God (in foolish man's conception) than a limited salvation? Let me treat the reader to a specimen of their systematical reasoning. They say: "If the atonement had been made by a mere man," it would necessarily have been limited; or, "If it had been made by an angel," it must also have been limited. Thus they tell us very seriously what would have been the result if a natural impossibility had come to pass. It would be equally as rational, and equally as creditable, to speak of an atonement being made by a mouse, as by an angel or a mere man. And, after all, what is the difference? We admit that an atonement made by a Divine person must possess in itself a value and glory corresponding with the dignity of Him who made it; but if it is a real, a veritable vicarious atonement, it must be as capable of application to the whole world, if made by an angel or a mere man, as if made by the Lord of glory.

The rank and dignity of the Redeemer are supposed to be such as they would be on the supposition that the atonement was intended to be general. This is true; and it is also true that they are just what they would and must be if the atonement was intended to save but one sinner. If Christ were not the Son of God, He could not make any atonement at all. Such flimsy and spurious arguments may have, in some measure, the effect intended by the authors, but their insignificance is very easily exposed.

The very terms employed in discussing the subject are sometimes highly objectionable, and even offensive to the heart of a pious and intelligent Christian. They speak of Christ as having been selected for the work in consequence, or on the ground of His rank and dignity, with a view to guard us against the supposition of any limitation of the atonement. The term selected implies that there were others as well as He who might have been chosen; and though they were inferior in rank and dignity, yet they were competent, for otherwise there was no propriety in speaking of His being selected. How disparaging to the honor of the Son of God to be told that there were others who could have redeemed lost sinners if He had declined the service.

3. It is supposed that data may be found in the mediatorial administration of the Divine government to warrant an inference in favor of universal atonement. Arguments legitimately derived from the mediatorship of our great High Priest are certainly worthy of the highest consideration; and any argument professing to have its foundation there should not be disregarded. It is a very easy task to prove that Jesus Christ is invested with the administration of the universal government of God; and this argument proceeds on the hypothesis that the atonement is the basis of His mediatorial government. This hypothesis will admit of debate; and I ask permission, without giving offense to say a few words: If we accept this assumption, it must be on certain conditions and with some modification. It involves a theme that opens a wide field to our contemplation. To explore this field even very partially, would impose upon us more labor and intense reflection than would comport with the design of this work--more, indeed, than I would be willing to impose upon the reader or upon myself. I must therefore, content myself with making a few brief suggestions:

All things in the natural and moral creation are mediatorially related to God through Christ; for so the Scriptures plainly teach. But when I speak of the mediatorial government of Christ I have special reference to His being a Mediator between God and sinners for the purpose of reconciliation; and as, in this point of view, He is the Mediator of the "New Covenant," His mediatorial administration is comprehended within, and bounded by, the conditions and provisions of the New Covenant. It would, therefore, seem to me more proper to say that the basis of His mediatorial government is the New Covenant; for the atonement is certainly a fundamental condition of the covenant of grace, and it is also a part of His mediatorial administration. In ascertaining and defining the extent of the atonement, I do not see that we are authorized to go beyond the extent of His strictly mediatorial administration; nor do I see how we can consistently carry either of these beyond the extent of that covenant of which He is the Mediator. I confess it appears to me that if we pass the boundaries of the strictly mediatorial administration of Christ--as the Mediator of the New Covenant--we fall at once under that universal moral government of God, of which Christ is the administrator, but not a mediator--using the term mediator in its evangelical sense.

I had made up my mind not to take any notice of this particular point; but, considering its important bearing on the question of the extent of the atonement, I doubted whether I would be justifiable in the omission; especially as I thought an intimation in that direction might be acceptable to some who may read this work.

But aside from the considerations presented above, let us ascertain what inferences the aforesaid hypothesis will justify, and whether the arguments founded upon the proposition are legitimately derived.

I find myself at a loss how to proceed in attempting to canvass the arguments employed to support the validity of their deductions. The reason is, their language is so general and indefinite that I am unable to ascertain the precise idea that they seem willing to convey to the mind of the reader.

They assume, as a first principle, or at least as a primary proposition, that as all power and authority are given into the hands of the Mediator, and as this dominion is given to Him on the ground that He has made atonement, this atonement must have some reference to the whole human race.

But right here the question will present itself, What reference has the atonement to the whole human family? Does it have the same reference to those that are saved that it has to those that are lost? This is precisely the question that requires solution; and while they propose to discuss this question, they seem to me to direct their arguments against those who advocate the commercial scheme of atonement, and the prime question receives very little attention. They hold that the atonement has a bearing or influence on the whole creation, and especially on the angels, who are desirous to learn the glorious mysteries of the cross. This we do not deny; but does the atonement have the same reference to these angels that it does to those sinners who are washed from their sins in the blood of the Lamb? The dividing of the waters of the Red Sea had a very important reference to the Canaanites and to the Egyptians, and even to us, and to all in every age and every place where the Bible is found; but were the waters of the Red Sea divided to make a way for us to pass through? Was it done for the benefit of Pharaoh and his army? Was it intended to be an advantage to the Canaanites? Did that miraculous interposition have the same reference to the Egyptians that it had to the Israelites? To speak, therefore, of the atonement as having some relations to the whole race of man, without indicating whether such relations are saving relations--without signifying whether it has the same relation to those who are saved that it has to those that are not saved--without making any allusion to the specific design of God in providing the atonement--I say to treat the subject in this way conveys very little instruction to the mind of an ingenious inquirer.

The whole work of making atonement is the same, whether it was the divine purpose that many shall be actually saved by it or only a few. And the reward of the Redeemer for this service--that is, His exaltation--is the same, whether in its personal relations it extends to all or only to a part; and as His elevation to the throne of government is the reward of His humiliation and obedience unto death, I do not see how it justifies the inference of a universal atonement any more than it would justify an inference in favor of a universal salvation.

In His exaltation, He becomes "Head over all things to the Church "--to the Church, for the Church's sake. The grand object to be accomplished by the atonement was the redemption of His Church. But why should we extend the efficacy of the atonement, considered as atonement, beyond the necessity that required it, and apply it to objects which were never affected by sin, and never could be? It was sin that made an atonement necessary; and when that necessity was fully met and supplied, atonement, as such, can have no further action or proper application. The fruits of atonement--its various results or consequences--may be extended far and wide, both as it respects Him who made it and those for whom it was made; but these do not belong to the essence or inherent nature of the atonement.

In connection with the mediatorial government of Christ, and by the same process of reasoning, an inference is drawn in favor of universal atonement, from the fact that Christ is to judge the world at the last day. But this argument is liable to the same objections as the other, and may be answered in the same way. In the final judgment, the King will say to those on His right hand, "Come, ye blessed," etc.; and to those on His left hand, "Depart, ye cursed," etc. Now, the question is, Does the atonement have the same relation to one of those parties that it has to the other? Both parties stand in the same relation to Him as a Judge. Do they stand in the same relation to Him as a Redeemer? Or, taking the question in another form and more directly to the point under discussion, Was the atonement designed (intended) for one of those parties as much as for the other? If the atonement does not have an equal relation to both, and was designed to effect as much for one as for the other, the argument proves too much; and the same may be said of the argument in favor of universal atonement as deduced from the fact that all--both the just and the unjust--will be raised from the dead through Christ; for some will come forth "to resurrection of life," and others "to the resurrection of damnation." Shall we attribute the damnation of the wicked to the atonement? I repeat, that those writers, if I understand their arguments, do not observe the distinction between the sufficiency and the design of the atonement. If their object is to prove the sufficiency of the atonement, their arguments may be entitled to consideration; but I do not think they adopt the best method of attaining the end in view. The true way of establishing this doctrine is to examine it in its relations to God. If it meets and satisfies these relations; if it completely vindicates the integrity and honor of Divine justice; if it fully and effectually satisfies all the demands of the law against sinners, this is all the sufficiency that the necessity requires. If its sufficiency is such that God is "well pleased" with it, it must of necessity be sufficient for all the purposes of an atonement in its relations to us; for it must, of course, remove all legal obstacles out of the way of any sinner's acceptance with God; that is, there can be no legal ground why God may not apply its benefits to any sinner, so far as it is His good pleasure to extend it. And that the atonement is sufficient for these purposes, we need no other proof than the fact that Christ rose from the dead, and is seated at the right hand of the Majesty on high. I do not say that no other proof can be adduced, but it is sufficient to supersede the necessity of additional proof.

But let the sufficiency of the atonement be established on as strong grounds as it may, it will prove nothing to the purpose as to the design for which it was made, in a personal and numerical poi